Thanks Sally! Further to your interesting point, there is an old view that the over-centralization of the Qin regime, its failure to leave enough initiative to provincial and local officials, hastened its demise. I believe the biography of 项羽 reflects this. Cheers - AV
Ha, thanks Professor! 项羽 was a fascinating historical figure. Son of a former feudal lord, he was a prodigy military genius who was able to defeat the massive Qin army in an uprising. However, he was unable to win the support of former rival feudal lords and eventually died by killing himself. 项羽 provided an "interlude" between the short lived Qin Dynasty and Han Dynasty (202 BC - 220 AD).
An important figure emerged following the death of 项羽. Liu Bang was a scholar more than a military man. He ended the rivalry between the feudal warlords and founded the Han Dynasty with assistance of his generals and advisors. He reigned from 206–195 BC as Gaozu Emperor.
WHAT WAS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT GAOZU was he copied the highly centralized Qin administrative structure by dividing the country into a series of administrative areas ruled by centrally appointed officials. Additionally he developed a salaried bureaucracy in which promotion was BASED ON MERIT. **Unlike Qin Shi Huang, Han Gaozu adopted a *Confucian ideology* that emphasized moderation, virtue, and filial piety. Gaozu's system proved to effectively militate against the authoritarian nature of the regime**, enabling Han to be a golden period in Chinese history. Cheers. :)
It is so nice to read you on TND again, Prof Vermeule. And what a barn stormer to announce your return.
Thus far after spending a few hours in the reading, I managed to digest only the first 3 paragraphs following the beginning quotes.
I would like to augment a specific point in one of them: “It is a simple mistake, both conceptually and historically, to understand this empire of peace as intrinsically homogenizing, as hostile to the distinctiveness of peoples nations in the classical sense and cultures.”
Indeed, the history of Qin (221-206 BC) illustrates poignantly the complementarity between what is called here “homogenization” and what I, as a student of human behavior, call “individualization” [a concept in developmental psychology (cf. Piaget, Winnicott, Maslow] The latter does not, cannot, in the classical Chinese world view, exist in the vacuum of the former.
Allow me to explain. Upon unifying the Warring States (481-403 BC Period of 春秋戰國), 秦始皇 immediately set about to abolish the system of feudal lords and replaced it with division of the land he governed into regional counties under one central government. Significantly he also ordered a standardized system of measurements of distance, weight and currency. To support the administration of central government, he devised a taxation system known as 井田制 where each plot of farmland 田 was divided into 9 equal sub-divisions as in the character “井”; the harvest in the middle plot constituted tax and those in the remaining 8 belonged to the farmers; in this manner, good and poor harvests were shared by government and farmers share and share alike. The concepts devised and established by 秦始皇 has left important imprints in Chinese political thoughts in two respects: One, there is no room for deviation from what is “standardized” or “homogenized”. Two: It is in this homogenized environment that individualization enjoys opportunity for optimal human growth.
A parallel idea to homogenization was found in Book of Rites (475 BC- 221 BC) which traces its origin to Confucius (551-478 BC) who emphasized the importance of unified practical moral values which end goal is "大同"。 In context, I translate “大同” as “The Grand Harmony”, or simply, “The Common Good.”
Brilliant piece. Just two weeks ago, while standing before the tomb of St. Robert Bellarmine in the Church of St. Ignatius in Rome, I thought of you. I said a brief prayer that God would protect and strengthen you amid such terrible sorrow and that we would soon see your work again. It is so good to see you back.
Welcome back Adrian, another great, instructive piece. Your inimitable voice and scholarship were sorely missed. My heartfelt condolences on the passing of your amazing son. God bless you and your family. Wishing you well
Most of the way through reading this, I thought I was going to have to mention that it never directly addresses economic decentralization, only cultural/social decentralization. However, it technically does so indirectly by stating that “China remains, by quantitative measures, among the most decentralized political systems in the world.” (Xi has been implementing some centralization measures, its starting to seem that the specifics of these efforts and progress are tough to asses, even for those who closely follow the situation and have contacts.) The essay fails to mention that this political decentralization necessarily entails significant economic decentralization. Cities (the big ones are really city-counties) sometimes engage in trade protectionism against the rest of China, they hold most fiscal authority, they have significant control over the operations of state enterprises in their areas, their local parties are widely representative of more than half of the broader population's socio-economic spectrum (half of party members don't have college degrees, and many that do have what we'd call vocational degrees here; "party school" correspondence degrees don't count in this specific context). If I elaborated further, readers would see that contemporary China, as referenced by the essay's author, resembles the USA's highly populist Old Republic in significant structural ways. Thus, if the author advocates for imitating it, he would largely align with so called populist nationalists. But he needs to elaborate more on the economic, fiscal, and business regulatory fronts (both China and the USA's Old Republic were decentralized in these areas, among others) in order to actually asses what he's trying to say.
Additionally, I would note that the Roman Empire itself went through periods of decentralization. After some reportedly tough times, in a situation somewhat resembling the USA today, it decentralized via the instituting of the Tetrarchy, which partially split and regionalized the executive branch while also granting provinces more autonomy.
*it *may* have been doing so through mention of subsidiarity, but that can mean different things to different people
Thanks so much sir, that’s very kind
Thanks Sally! Further to your interesting point, there is an old view that the over-centralization of the Qin regime, its failure to leave enough initiative to provincial and local officials, hastened its demise. I believe the biography of 项羽 reflects this. Cheers - AV
Ha, thanks Professor! 项羽 was a fascinating historical figure. Son of a former feudal lord, he was a prodigy military genius who was able to defeat the massive Qin army in an uprising. However, he was unable to win the support of former rival feudal lords and eventually died by killing himself. 项羽 provided an "interlude" between the short lived Qin Dynasty and Han Dynasty (202 BC - 220 AD).
An important figure emerged following the death of 项羽. Liu Bang was a scholar more than a military man. He ended the rivalry between the feudal warlords and founded the Han Dynasty with assistance of his generals and advisors. He reigned from 206–195 BC as Gaozu Emperor.
WHAT WAS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT GAOZU was he copied the highly centralized Qin administrative structure by dividing the country into a series of administrative areas ruled by centrally appointed officials. Additionally he developed a salaried bureaucracy in which promotion was BASED ON MERIT. **Unlike Qin Shi Huang, Han Gaozu adopted a *Confucian ideology* that emphasized moderation, virtue, and filial piety. Gaozu's system proved to effectively militate against the authoritarian nature of the regime**, enabling Han to be a golden period in Chinese history. Cheers. :)
Thank you sir
I was sorry to read about your son's passing, may he rest in peace.
It is so nice to read you on TND again, Prof Vermeule. And what a barn stormer to announce your return.
Thus far after spending a few hours in the reading, I managed to digest only the first 3 paragraphs following the beginning quotes.
I would like to augment a specific point in one of them: “It is a simple mistake, both conceptually and historically, to understand this empire of peace as intrinsically homogenizing, as hostile to the distinctiveness of peoples nations in the classical sense and cultures.”
Indeed, the history of Qin (221-206 BC) illustrates poignantly the complementarity between what is called here “homogenization” and what I, as a student of human behavior, call “individualization” [a concept in developmental psychology (cf. Piaget, Winnicott, Maslow] The latter does not, cannot, in the classical Chinese world view, exist in the vacuum of the former.
Allow me to explain. Upon unifying the Warring States (481-403 BC Period of 春秋戰國), 秦始皇 immediately set about to abolish the system of feudal lords and replaced it with division of the land he governed into regional counties under one central government. Significantly he also ordered a standardized system of measurements of distance, weight and currency. To support the administration of central government, he devised a taxation system known as 井田制 where each plot of farmland 田 was divided into 9 equal sub-divisions as in the character “井”; the harvest in the middle plot constituted tax and those in the remaining 8 belonged to the farmers; in this manner, good and poor harvests were shared by government and farmers share and share alike. The concepts devised and established by 秦始皇 has left important imprints in Chinese political thoughts in two respects: One, there is no room for deviation from what is “standardized” or “homogenized”. Two: It is in this homogenized environment that individualization enjoys opportunity for optimal human growth.
A parallel idea to homogenization was found in Book of Rites (475 BC- 221 BC) which traces its origin to Confucius (551-478 BC) who emphasized the importance of unified practical moral values which end goal is "大同"。 In context, I translate “大同” as “The Grand Harmony”, or simply, “The Common Good.”
大同 (great same) looks like it could even mean Equity
Welcome back, Adrian. God bless you and your family.
Brilliant piece. Just two weeks ago, while standing before the tomb of St. Robert Bellarmine in the Church of St. Ignatius in Rome, I thought of you. I said a brief prayer that God would protect and strengthen you amid such terrible sorrow and that we would soon see your work again. It is so good to see you back.
Welcome back Adrian, another great, instructive piece. Your inimitable voice and scholarship were sorely missed. My heartfelt condolences on the passing of your amazing son. God bless you and your family. Wishing you well
Most of the way through reading this, I thought I was going to have to mention that it never directly addresses economic decentralization, only cultural/social decentralization. However, it technically does so indirectly by stating that “China remains, by quantitative measures, among the most decentralized political systems in the world.” (Xi has been implementing some centralization measures, its starting to seem that the specifics of these efforts and progress are tough to asses, even for those who closely follow the situation and have contacts.) The essay fails to mention that this political decentralization necessarily entails significant economic decentralization. Cities (the big ones are really city-counties) sometimes engage in trade protectionism against the rest of China, they hold most fiscal authority, they have significant control over the operations of state enterprises in their areas, their local parties are widely representative of more than half of the broader population's socio-economic spectrum (half of party members don't have college degrees, and many that do have what we'd call vocational degrees here; "party school" correspondence degrees don't count in this specific context). If I elaborated further, readers would see that contemporary China, as referenced by the essay's author, resembles the USA's highly populist Old Republic in significant structural ways. Thus, if the author advocates for imitating it, he would largely align with so called populist nationalists. But he needs to elaborate more on the economic, fiscal, and business regulatory fronts (both China and the USA's Old Republic were decentralized in these areas, among others) in order to actually asses what he's trying to say.
Additionally, I would note that the Roman Empire itself went through periods of decentralization. After some reportedly tough times, in a situation somewhat resembling the USA today, it decentralized via the instituting of the Tetrarchy, which partially split and regionalized the executive branch while also granting provinces more autonomy.
*it *may* have been doing so through mention of subsidiarity, but that can mean different things to different people
That’s wonderful, thanks very much for that.