Nicely done, Adrian! A great deal of this sounds, in the abstract and when you put it bluntly, like common sense. The idea that one can think about law without purpose, or judgment, is sort of crazy on its face -- yet needs to be said. Evidently. This has consequences that are quite contemporary, and in that sense, not "classical" -- your reference en passant to algorithms is spot on, but unbelievably hard to express in a techy setting. More detailed anon, Deo volante, but for now, keep up the good work.
I appreciate the classical tradition, and agreed with Judge Matey's takeaway from Blackstone and others - that Western legal thought traditionally recognized the legitimacy of self-defense, while also recognizing the legitimacy of disarming those who pose an apparent threat to community safety or national security. But the natural right Judge Matey seeks to preserve manifested in the common law tradition through other legal avenues - as an affirmative defense to criminal charge (Range was not charged with unlawful possession), through statutory protections Congress enacted in 18 U.S.C. 925(c) along with the prohibition Range challenged, and through traditional canons of statutory interpretation, like the absurdity doctrine. I was disappointed that Judge Matey decided to destabilize an area constitutional law, introducing undue uncertainty for future judges and for citizens who want to comport their behavior to the law, and collapsing the merits of the case with constitutional law (supposed to be the foundation upon which the rest of the legal system functions). I think the same common good principles should have been channeled through a traditional absurdity analysis of the statute - Congress obviously did not intend to disarm men like Bryan Range who seem to pose no special threat to public safety, as evidenced that Congress included a provision in the Gun Control Act for such individuals to petition for relief (Congress now nullifies this by defunding it through an annual budget rider). Interpreting the statute - 922(g)(1) - to disarm Range for life is an absurd result the legislature would not have intended. Judge Matey is using the constitution to do an ad-hoc job for which the interpretive canons are better suited. Matey's approach diminishes both constitutionalism and the traditional canons.
Nicely done, Adrian! A great deal of this sounds, in the abstract and when you put it bluntly, like common sense. The idea that one can think about law without purpose, or judgment, is sort of crazy on its face -- yet needs to be said. Evidently. This has consequences that are quite contemporary, and in that sense, not "classical" -- your reference en passant to algorithms is spot on, but unbelievably hard to express in a techy setting. More detailed anon, Deo volante, but for now, keep up the good work.
I appreciate the classical tradition, and agreed with Judge Matey's takeaway from Blackstone and others - that Western legal thought traditionally recognized the legitimacy of self-defense, while also recognizing the legitimacy of disarming those who pose an apparent threat to community safety or national security. But the natural right Judge Matey seeks to preserve manifested in the common law tradition through other legal avenues - as an affirmative defense to criminal charge (Range was not charged with unlawful possession), through statutory protections Congress enacted in 18 U.S.C. 925(c) along with the prohibition Range challenged, and through traditional canons of statutory interpretation, like the absurdity doctrine. I was disappointed that Judge Matey decided to destabilize an area constitutional law, introducing undue uncertainty for future judges and for citizens who want to comport their behavior to the law, and collapsing the merits of the case with constitutional law (supposed to be the foundation upon which the rest of the legal system functions). I think the same common good principles should have been channeled through a traditional absurdity analysis of the statute - Congress obviously did not intend to disarm men like Bryan Range who seem to pose no special threat to public safety, as evidenced that Congress included a provision in the Gun Control Act for such individuals to petition for relief (Congress now nullifies this by defunding it through an annual budget rider). Interpreting the statute - 922(g)(1) - to disarm Range for life is an absurd result the legislature would not have intended. Judge Matey is using the constitution to do an ad-hoc job for which the interpretive canons are better suited. Matey's approach diminishes both constitutionalism and the traditional canons.