“…as if respect for the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and respect for the ECHR were synonymous.”
Of course, one can theoretically distinguish the true meaning of the Convention—aligned with the signatories’ original intent—from the grossly erroneous practice of the Court and, earlier, the Commission. The problem, however, is that the Convention’s interpretation has been corrupted from the very beginning. When Max Sørensen first used the phrase “living instrument” (strictly, “living legal instrument”) in 1975, he was referring to an already well-established practice of the Commission that embodied virtually every method of dynamic interpretation whose effects are now visible in thousands of judgments. A handful of dissenting opinions by Judge Fitzmaurice (fascinating though they are), or—even in recent years—the numerous dissents of Judge Wojtyczek, are far too little to contemplate “curing” the Convention’s interpretation. One would have to rewrite the Convention’s history from scratch, disregarding its interpretation by the Convention organs altogether. Things are different with the U.S. Constitution: there, a movement to recover the “true” Constitution is justified and has a genuine foundation to draw upon. The corruption of the Constitution is not co-extensive with its entire period of validity.
"Political authority exists solely to serve the good and flourishing of all citizens."
Given the intelligence and insight in the analysis of the problems with the debate, one can only ask what planet the author lives on where this is a non-idiotic statement.
Excellent contribution!
“…as if respect for the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and respect for the ECHR were synonymous.”
Of course, one can theoretically distinguish the true meaning of the Convention—aligned with the signatories’ original intent—from the grossly erroneous practice of the Court and, earlier, the Commission. The problem, however, is that the Convention’s interpretation has been corrupted from the very beginning. When Max Sørensen first used the phrase “living instrument” (strictly, “living legal instrument”) in 1975, he was referring to an already well-established practice of the Commission that embodied virtually every method of dynamic interpretation whose effects are now visible in thousands of judgments. A handful of dissenting opinions by Judge Fitzmaurice (fascinating though they are), or—even in recent years—the numerous dissents of Judge Wojtyczek, are far too little to contemplate “curing” the Convention’s interpretation. One would have to rewrite the Convention’s history from scratch, disregarding its interpretation by the Convention organs altogether. Things are different with the U.S. Constitution: there, a movement to recover the “true” Constitution is justified and has a genuine foundation to draw upon. The corruption of the Constitution is not co-extensive with its entire period of validity.
"Political authority exists solely to serve the good and flourishing of all citizens."
Given the intelligence and insight in the analysis of the problems with the debate, one can only ask what planet the author lives on where this is a non-idiotic statement.