"Send no lunge beyond thy length," as a wise man once said. Judicial arrogance and overreach is the most toxic solvent to the rule of law, which really is a social construct and more fragile than we'd like to admit.
Traditional respect for other branches' functions would require non to halt expenses which have been the object of decisions taken by the legislative, in discharge of constitutional duties (Art. I appropriations clause), not to dismiss (=fire) employees who are providing for the general welfare of the US under congressional mandate, not to put the federal executive under a ketaminic guy not appointed with advice and consent of the Senate...
Scalia was also a strong defender of Chevron; perhaps a position he wouldn’t take today. You can’t both negate Chevron and support “traditional respect for…”; they’re essentially the same thing.
To my mind, that’s a perfect example of how judges (and commentators) can enact their priors by playing games with doctrines. The fundamental principle (or question at issue) is the same in both case: at what point is the judiciary allowed,’or even required, to rein in the executive? Presumably the answer should be something like “when the executive breaks the law,” right?
"Send no lunge beyond thy length," as a wise man once said. Judicial arrogance and overreach is the most toxic solvent to the rule of law, which really is a social construct and more fragile than we'd like to admit.
It's from Kipling, who I consider the wisest of the Moderns. I tear up whenever I read this poem.
https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_outsong.htm
Traditional respect for other branches' functions would require non to halt expenses which have been the object of decisions taken by the legislative, in discharge of constitutional duties (Art. I appropriations clause), not to dismiss (=fire) employees who are providing for the general welfare of the US under congressional mandate, not to put the federal executive under a ketaminic guy not appointed with advice and consent of the Senate...
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Article II, Section 1, Clause 1.
Scalia was also a strong defender of Chevron; perhaps a position he wouldn’t take today. You can’t both negate Chevron and support “traditional respect for…”; they’re essentially the same thing.
To my mind, that’s a perfect example of how judges (and commentators) can enact their priors by playing games with doctrines. The fundamental principle (or question at issue) is the same in both case: at what point is the judiciary allowed,’or even required, to rein in the executive? Presumably the answer should be something like “when the executive breaks the law,” right?