What Future for Post-liberalism?

Review of “The Post-Liberal Turn and the Future of Conservatism” (Ludovika University Press, 2024)

Second Battle of the Virginia Capes (Hampton Roads Naval Museum)

The New Digest is pleased to present this review by André P. DeBattista. Professor DeBattista is a political scientist at the University of Malta and a research associate at the Martens Centre in Brussels.

The term post-liberalism has gained traction in the past couple of years. What it means precisely, however, is still a matter of debate. The volume “The Post-Liberal Turn and the Future of Conservatism”, edited by Daniel Pitt and Phillip Blond and published by Ludovika University Press, attempts to explore some of these different strands of “post-liberalism”. Each of the excellent thirteen contributions is the product of an international conference which explores various aspects of post-liberalism. And each of these contributions is an example of how the Anglo-American political tradition can enter into dialogue and converge in a European milieu.

There are three main themes which, I believe, emerge from this collection of papers. Firstly, post-liberalism equally deals with a crisis in both liberalism and conservatism, of two great strands of political thinking that have, slowly but surely, lost their way and have become almost parodies of what they originally stood for. Secondly, post-liberalism is still being defined, though the fact that it remains an open-ended question is not a problem since it allows these exchanges to occur. Thirdly, the conservative political tradition stands at a crossroads. Its success, or otherwise, depends on the road it chooses.

The drubbing the British Conservative Party took at the 2024 UK General Election makes this debate more prescient than ever. The introduction to the book makes two significant statements. Firstly, it argues that “the exhausted lingering of liberalism as the hegemonic philosophy is over.” Secondly, it asserts that “the future of British conservatism seems to be open, but highly fractured, contested and polarised.”

Though most of the contributions deal with this issue in relation to British politics, there is an understanding that the future of British conservatism has international repercussions.

Professor Ferenc Hörcher’s personal and historical recollections of Central European Anglophilia explore some of these elements. Britain looks “somewhat different, idiosyncratic and strange” from a European perspective since it does not follow continental trends. This meant that it often became a focal point for anti-status-quo sentiments, an alternative to the French Enlightenment and, later, Napoleon’s ambitions; an alternative to the authoritarianism of Bismarck or Hitler and, behind the Iron Curtain, a form of anti-communist sentiment. For example, English became an alternative to the compulsory Russian lessons at school. Yet, this Anglophilia went beyond the symbolic and the aspirational and could be “regarded as a particular political philosophy that is embodied in certain ways of life and styles of behaviour.” This philosophy manifests not simply in manners and manières but also in admiration for a particular political system underpinned by the rule of law. This made Anglophilia attractive to opponents of the various totalitarian regimes which mushroomed in the 20^th century. Given this, it comes as no surprise that Anglophilia was not merely regarded suspiciously by these regimes but actively suppressed.

This discussion also makes it apparent that the form of conservatism taking shape in Britain will have widespread repercussions on the different manifestations of conservatism. The volume also delineates some of the central debates emerging in conservative circles.

Phillip Blond presents two crucial observations. He posits that the greatest failure of liberalism is that it denies tradition and shared values, thus producing “a fragmented and warring populace that requires the Leviathan to police it” and introducing absolutist practices that it claims to be fighting against. However, he also offers an engaging critique of nationalism, describing it as a “great killing organisation of the modern age” and making the case for the empire, which historically “encompassed many nations” and “sustained ethnic and religious diversity and protected minorities.” Blond furthers his critique by arguing that nationalism is wrong “politically, philosophically and theologically.” According to Blond, the solution for post-liberals is to rediscover the universal aims of political actions and issues that are by nature universal and pose the greatest challenge to the current manifestation of liberalism – religion and order. Blond’s provocative conclusion is that universalism “can best sustain nations” for “if nations do not buy into something bigger than themselves, they will be erased by those that do.”

CJ Schilt is less enthused about universalism – particularly the kind endorsed by the European Union. He believes that “Europe’s über-liberalism, combined with the forceful approach with which the EU promotes, or rather, dictates, its identikit, all too eerily resembles the authoritarian life behind the Iron Curtain.” He is also critical of the conservative response to this and other forms of liberalism “because conservatism critiqued it with its mouth yet embraced it with its heart.” He, thus, makes the point that conservatism needs to look within itself before responding to the current form of liberalism.

The chapters dealing with the future of conservatism in the UK are particularly relevant given the ongoing debate on the future of the Conservative Party. They give a snapshot of the debates on post-liberalism within British academia.

Christopher Fear posts that the post-liberal turn is not a new name for conservatism or a school of thought within the conservative movement but “a broader condition within which all political parties must increasingly operate.” This statement has much truth since post-liberalism has manifested itself in both the left and the right, though its success on the right has been more marked than on the left. Parties themselves remain coalitions, and the Conservative Party is no exception: “At any time it has had within its ranks Whigs, Tories, protectionists and free marketeers, National Liberals, traditionalists, modernisers, individualists, collectivists, unionists, imperialists, Eurosceptics and Europhiles, and so on: factions or traditions with differing emphases.” Among the many pertinent observations made, the author suggests that the Conservative Party retains its sceptical tradition and embrace more prudence in government while restoring “the conditions of the nation’s established institutions” such as grammar schools, technical colleges, non-intensive farming, trade unions, marriage and family, and local businesses and churches.

Kevin Hickson points out that the main challenge for conservatives comes from cosmopolitan liberals who, rather than value “the classical liberal belief in tolerance and diversity of opinion”, are increasingly becoming intolerant and authoritarian. He cogently explains that economic liberals also inspire economic viewpoints. He explains that the prevailing view that there is no alternative to the neo-liberal Thatcherite economic model has taken hold and posits that social conservatives did little to reverse much of the social liberalism of the past half-century. However, he makes the case that there is scope “to develop a clear alternative to the economic liberal belief that ‘free’ markets are almost without exception desirable.” This would be necessary to develop an alternative political model based on the “politics of the common good”, which “prioritises the needs of the nation as a whole.”

Matt Beech posits that post-liberalism could be a “slippery” concept. He does not repudiate liberalism or its instincts, arguing that, properly understood, liberalism “emerges out of the Christian presupposition of the equal moral worth of each human being.” It is rooted in the idea that man is created in the image of God and, therefore, every human is an image bearer. Rather than pinpoint issues to liberalism, Beech identifies cultural Marxism as a pathogen. He points out that “liberalism cannot be the adversary of a society predicated upon centuries of Christian thought through which liberalism emerged.”

Eric Kaufmann makes the case for a “liberal post-liberalism”. While refuting that this constitutes a contradiction, he makes the case for liberal democracy. For conservatives to use its instruments to “reform the system and improve the climate for conservative values.” Indeed, he boldly asserts that “the future of post-liberalism is liberal”. However, he qualifies this statement by stating that “positive liberalism must be rejected” and that “conservatives should draw on a Hobbesian procedural liberalism” and form coalitions “with centrist liberals to push back against anti-conservatism in our institutions.”

David Jeffrey tries to identify the extent to which post-liberalism manifests itself in the Conservative Party. Tracing the development of the post-Brexit Conservative Party, he notes the initial belief that Theresa May would be the first of several Red Tory/Blue Labour leaders dissipated as she failed to show credible statecraft. Johnson was primarily seen as a cosmopolitan liberal, Liz Truss a “committed free-marketeer”, and Rishi Sunak epitomised “grey economic managerialism”. He posits that there have been “no real postliberal” candidates for the Conservative Party leadership.

Some contributions in this collection hint at some of the platforms that may be tapped into when devising a post-liberal future.

Daniel Pitt suggests that the Conservative Party should embrace the environment and its protection as a policy platform. This is intrinsically tied with Scruton’s idea of “oikophilia” – an attachment to a place with its landscape and a desire to conserve it – and a recognition that the “oikos is the place that is not just mine and yours but ours.”

Henry George cogently argues that the prevailing neo-liberalism left many “poorer, disenfranchised and alienated”. However, this is not a result of specific policy actions but, instead, due to the “fundamental flaws in the worldview that these political decisions articulated.” He posits that austerity policies have negatively affected “those shoulders least able to bear the weight”, particularly disabled persons. Such policies have protected the neo-liberal political order and individualism but have weakened “the common life of the whole national community.”

Imogen Sinclair explored how modernity depicts a fragmented world and argues for a conservative interpretation of Freud to “redirect human conduct towards the common good”, which she calls the “order of the covenant.” This calls for “an old-new metaphysics where the natural and the supernatural, theory and reality, and the sacred and profane mutually reinforce the right way to be human.”

Ishaan Jajodia focuses on “the demise of fusionism and the rise of American post-liberalism.” In his analysis, he states that “liberalism does a poor job tending to the very things that make it successful”, but a conservative should not rally against it but understand its limitations. Therefore, post-liberalism can be successful if it argues for elements vital for the proper functioning of a polity: “local communities, the family, patriotism, hard work and a genuine equality under the law.”

The concluding note of the book gives a personal perspective on the future of British Conservatism. It posits that “the future of conservatism needs to enable people to live a conservative life, to enable the ownership of private property, to attain meaningful jobs, to build trust in our communities, to conserve and enhance our environment and to provide an education that passes on the best and necessary knowledge from one generation to the next.”

Indeed, the book makes the case for each of these and raises some critical points regarding delineating the main elements of a post-liberal order. Firstly, there is an understanding of the importance of tradition. Tradition is not understood as something nostalgic and folkloristic but, rather, something living which grounds the polity and sustains its institutions. Tradition seems to complement law in justifying the role and remit of institutions while also understanding that these roles must be circumscribed and limited.

This leads to another critical aspect of the post-liberal order: subsidiarity is fundamental to the functioning of a society. The limits placed on institutions also encourage other, more organic institutions to flourish. They include families, local communities and other entities such as churches and faith communities.

Ultimately, the post-liberal order seems to encourage what Kaufmann describes as “the politics of the common good” – an antidote to the politics of individualism, which has uncovered the weaknesses and shortcomings of modern-day liberalism. The contributions in this book serve to open a much-needed discussion.