The Importance of the Theology of Creation for Law
The Importance of the Theology of Creation for Law
An Interesting New Book
The New Digest is pleased to offer the following post by Mr. Gideon Lazar, in conjunction with a new book he has co-edited: I Believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth: Studies in the Theology of Creation, Volume 1, available here.
Mr. Lazar is the institute coordinator for the St. Basil Institute for the Study of the Theology of Creation. He received his BA in Classics and Medieval/Byzantine Studies from the Catholic University of America. He is currently working on his MA in Theology at Sts. Cyril and Methodius Byzantine Catholic Seminary.
As is well known, for St. Thomas Aquinas, in order for a law to be a law, it must be based upon the natural law. This is the foundation of the classical legal tradition. However, many today deny the existence of a natural law, and hence deny the value of the classical legal tradition. I wish to argue here that the rejection of natural law is part of a larger crisis in cosmology, and that the only solution to this crisis is the recognition of reality of the doctrine of creation.
For St. Thomas, creation has two meanings, one philosophical and the other theological. Since St. Thomas thinks the existence of the natural law can be arrived at by reason, he roots it in his philosophical conception of creation. For Thomas, since metaphysically the existence (esse) of a thing is distinct from what it is (essentia), all things must ultimately come from God, whose esse is His essentia. Thus, even from reason alone, we can know that God must have created the world (Summa Theologiae I q. 45 a. 1). Thomas does not think that it can be proven by reason alone that the world began to exist in time, but God exists outside time so this is not an issue. Furthermore, we can recognize by reason the existence of final causality, and hence the order of nature by which God governs the universe (ST I q. 2 a. 3). Thomas calls this order providence (ST I q. 22).
Thomas later goes on to define law as an “ordinatio” (ST I-II q. 90 a. 4). While this is often translated as “ordinance,” the Latin retains the sense of “an ordering.” Law orders things extrinsically to an end. Hence, Thomas refers to God’s providence as “the eternal law” (ST I-II q. 91 a. 1). It is also important to add here that, while creation and providence are distinct in their effects, for God they are one and the same act. God creates the natures of things foreknowing how they will act according to those natures. This creates a key difference for human law and the eternal law. While human law must be made according to nature, the eternal law causes nature to be what it is (ST I-II q. 93 a. 5). God governs the world through His creation of it.
This finally brings us to the place of the natural law. Thomas defines the natural law as “a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature” (ST I-II q. 91 a. 2). Animals, plants, and rocks all simply act according to their natures. However, humans have rationality, and hence there needs to be a moral law. The eternal law, insofar as we can know it by reason, is that natural moral law. It is this natural law which serves as the basis for human law. Human law then is ultimately founded upon God’s plan in creation. It builds upon the existing created order for rational beings. However, it does so as a participation; that is, human lawgivers are not in competition with God’s lawgiving, but are given a certain freedom by God to specify the eternal law for their particular circumstances.
Just as grace builds upon nature, so too does our theological understanding of creation build upon our philosophical one. Only at the very heights of metaphysical speculation can one just barely grasp creation. However, in divine revelation, God teaches us about the creation and the natural order. We discover that God is indeed the Creator of all things and that there is a rational order to the creation. We discover that we are made in the image of God and given dominion over the natural world (i.e. our participation by reason in nature). We discover that we were not made as separated souls, but were created together body and soul, so the life of the human body is a good thing. We discover that we were made male and female, and so the sexual binary is the proper order of nature. Of course, many of these things can be defended with arguments from reason, but the average person is not a metaphysician. The average person can be, through grace, be made receptive to these truths more easily through divine revelation. Furthermore, we see through divine revelation how God’s intention in creating the world was ultimately to elevate it through grace (a truth inaccessible to reason), and so our political orders too ought to be receptive to grace. (In light of this, it is evident that arguments for a purely secular politics are nothing short of a repudiation of Catholic cosmology.)
The doctrine of creation can give us not only a metaphysical grounding for natural law, but also many specific theological truths which can serve as the basis for law. In a recent volume I edited for the St. Basil Institute for the Study of the Theology of Creation, I Believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth: Studies in the Theology of Creation Volume 1, we included some essays on various ways the doctrine of creation might inform law. It includes essays on ecology, bioethics, agriculture, and work (as well as many other essays not directly related to law). We hope this volume can be of some help towards the restoration of a Catholic cosmology rooted in the doctrine of creation. We also encourage scholars interested in working with us to reach out via email (gideonjacoblazar@gmail.com), and also to consider submitting an abstract to our upcoming symposium.
First, your major point is sound. The crisis in politics manifests a deeper crisis in cosmology. I worry, however, about your interpretation of Aquinas through Suarez that constitutes part of the problem rather than solving it.
For Aquinas, it seems to me that nature and grace are both two different realms and not two different realms at all. Creation is ex nihilo -- and thus always already graced, not necessary, as you so wisely write. It is not an "event in time" -- but it is an "emanation" of God, from whom, for whom, and to whom are all things. Natural law is not a distinct realm apart by grace, but that by which rational creatures may participate in the Divine Law. Aquinas's Aristotle is a relentless Platonist.
Humans, for Aquinas, aren't created "in the image of God" -- he follows the Vulgate (and most likely the original Hebrew and Greek). Humans are created TO the image of God, i.e., Jesus Christ, the fullness of the image of God. It is a graced, Christ-infused teleology that is very Augustinian. "The image of God" is not a "human possession" that grants particular "universal human rights." It is a grace-infused life that is open to pursue its end in Christ that should not be short-circuited but more intensely participated in through participation in God through the sacramental life of the church.
I obviously don't belong to the neo-scholastic Thomist interpretation that finds its origins in Suarez, but the neo-Platonic Thomas as explicated by Rudi te Velde. It is why natural law must itself find its origin in God, who is always already Triune. Degrees of participation may vary. I'm not sure the difference that this makes for the legal interpretation of "natural law." I merely have an intuition that it does.
Thank you for your work. I don't want to undercut the gist of the book. I would hope that my interpretation of Thomas strengthens rather than diminishes your main point.
This is an unexpected but delightful crossover post between some of my favorite public intellectuals - The Editors of the New Digest, and The Byzantine Scotist. Bravo! Can't wait to pick up the book.