The New Deal didnt centralize things any where as near as is taught. As late as 1941, the Federal government was the smallest of the three tiers of government in regards to both revenue intake and spending and in most of the country (at least most of its NE, Mid-West, and West regions) local governments were the largest revenue intakers and spenders. And the country retained significant legal/regulatory variability and policy variability often down to the local level, and its financial structures were still diffused and pluralized, same with its academe. And its politics were dominated by decentralized mass-member parties. There was a multidecadal transformation phase after WW2 that led to deep centralization.
From what I know the story is similar in the UK, pre WW2 decision making in the country was quite diffused and federated and then there was, like the USA a multidecadal transformation phase that became more or less close to complete by the early 1980s
In both cases, as well as other countries you mention in the essay (e.g. Italy, France, Spain), we cant just look at their internals, broader super structures they are a part of (the EU, and the planetary governance layer of capital "G" Globalization) , well, these countries are part of broader, quite centralized systems
Also, Diocletian was ultimately a de-centralizer, not a centralizer. The Tetrarchy, regional capitals, provincial reorganizations, etc led to autonomously directed-at-lower-levels policy variability across the empire
I understand that - but whenever you think the main focus of the centralisation was, there can hardly be any doubt that states have far less autonomy now than they did a century ago. , and the same applies in the other countries too. You're right to see a whole range of trends bearing on the different countries examined - but the pattern of centralisation generally applies. Take the point about Diocletian too. But his elements of decentralisation died with him, while the much bigger central bureaucracy carried through the whole later Empire and into the Byzantine empire too.
as you referenced in the essay with German example, it hasnt been a constant march. For example, in the USA, in the 1820s we were on a path of rapid centralization, and then a structural revolution occurred and it was deeply structurally decentralized, and we didnt get back to where we were on before the rev until over a hundred years and it turns out7 theres substantial reason to believe that the post WW2 moves inside the usa in these regards were contingent on us having entered WW2 and the continuation of deep centralization post 1970s may have been contingent on setting the planetary extractive structures of capital āGā Globalization, which much of our systems configuration has dependencies on; if thats going out the door, Iām not sure a big move towards even further consolidation (which our current structures may need toto survive) is guaranteed to ultimately succeed
The New Deal didnt centralize things any where as near as is taught. As late as 1941, the Federal government was the smallest of the three tiers of government in regards to both revenue intake and spending and in most of the country (at least most of its NE, Mid-West, and West regions) local governments were the largest revenue intakers and spenders. And the country retained significant legal/regulatory variability and policy variability often down to the local level, and its financial structures were still diffused and pluralized, same with its academe. And its politics were dominated by decentralized mass-member parties. There was a multidecadal transformation phase after WW2 that led to deep centralization.
From what I know the story is similar in the UK, pre WW2 decision making in the country was quite diffused and federated and then there was, like the USA a multidecadal transformation phase that became more or less close to complete by the early 1980s
In both cases, as well as other countries you mention in the essay (e.g. Italy, France, Spain), we cant just look at their internals, broader super structures they are a part of (the EU, and the planetary governance layer of capital "G" Globalization) , well, these countries are part of broader, quite centralized systems
Also, Diocletian was ultimately a de-centralizer, not a centralizer. The Tetrarchy, regional capitals, provincial reorganizations, etc led to autonomously directed-at-lower-levels policy variability across the empire
I understand that - but whenever you think the main focus of the centralisation was, there can hardly be any doubt that states have far less autonomy now than they did a century ago. , and the same applies in the other countries too. You're right to see a whole range of trends bearing on the different countries examined - but the pattern of centralisation generally applies. Take the point about Diocletian too. But his elements of decentralisation died with him, while the much bigger central bureaucracy carried through the whole later Empire and into the Byzantine empire too.
as you referenced in the essay with German example, it hasnt been a constant march. For example, in the USA, in the 1820s we were on a path of rapid centralization, and then a structural revolution occurred and it was deeply structurally decentralized, and we didnt get back to where we were on before the rev until over a hundred years and it turns out7 theres substantial reason to believe that the post WW2 moves inside the usa in these regards were contingent on us having entered WW2 and the continuation of deep centralization post 1970s may have been contingent on setting the planetary extractive structures of capital āGā Globalization, which much of our systems configuration has dependencies on; if thats going out the door, Iām not sure a big move towards even further consolidation (which our current structures may need toto survive) is guaranteed to ultimately succeed